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BOOK REVIEWS

Silencing the Guns In Haiti
ELIZABETH MENSCHt
On the contrary, consider how in spite of centuries of sin and
greed and lust and cruelty and hatred and avarice and oppression
and injustice, spawned and bred by the free wills of men, the
human race can still recover, each time, and can still produce men
and women who overcome evil with good, hatred with love, greed
with charity, lust and cruelty with sanctity. How could all this be
possible... ?

The history of pre-Aristide Haiti stands as a strangely
haunting example of the evils which Merton so insistently
lists. A lust for power and an insatiable, almost erotic
attachment to violence have permeated elite Haitian
culture since the days of the Slave Revolt. In those days
successful revolutionary leaders apparently chose to adopt
and refine, not repudiate, the worst sins of colonialism
Those sins have persistently remained at the core of the
Haitian experience.
The question posed by Stotzky's book is the same
question Merton asked: How can good eventually overcome
a history of pervasive evil? While Merton placed his own

t * Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law. Thanks to Markus
Dubber, Jack Schlegel, and Bert Westbrook.
1. THOMAS MERTON, THE SEVEN STOREY MOUNTAIN 128 (1948).
2. See IRWIN STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI: THE PROMISE OF
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 19 (1997).
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trust in divine grace,3 Stotzky looks instead to an eclectic
(and concededly tentative) combination of sensible economic
reform, participatory democracy, and deontological
commitment to individual autonomy as protected by the
rule of law. Recent discouraging news from Haiti suggests
the fragility of the reforms Stotzky describes; it also
suggests that waiting for divine grace to do its work in

Haiti is depressingly like waiting for Godot.

'

This review

will suggest that Stotzky's analysis is nonetheless
important for its relevance to our country as well as to
Haiti; the review will also suggest that there may be more
of a relationship between the Merton and the Stotzky
approaches than one might first suppose.
Chief among Haiti's historical "sins," as described by
Stotzky, is the systematic treatment of human beings as, in
effect, a subhuman, expendable resource to be ruthlessly
exploited or, where politically expedient, to be systematically slaughtered without qualm. Stotzky describes the
pre-Aristide Haitian political order as "predatory" in an
almost literal sense: its whole purpose was to allow the
elites to feed off the lower classes.' Taxes, never paid by the
upper classes, were simply a mechanism for extracting
wealth from the general population, and the state was
designed chiefly to be an instrument of terror for perfecting
the processes of exploitation.6 The open, unapologetic embrace of unspeakable cruelty has been so unabashed as to
suggest cultural norms that simply lie outside our own
modes of normative discourse. Haitian elites have treated
as routine and morally unproblematic, practices that
Americans would consider moral abominations. When two
cultures lack even a shared sense of what constitutes
abomination,7 we find ourselves in a state of true moral
incommensurability, which Stotzky suggests may in fact be
the case with Haiti.
3. See MERTON, supranote 1, at 128.
4. See Larry Rohter, Political Feuds Ravage Haiti: So Much for Its High
Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, October 18, 1998, at Section 1, 3; Larry Rohter, Haiti
ParalysisBrings a Boom in Drug Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, October 27, 1998, at A2.
One of the tragedies of Haiti is the impossibility of learning the truth of the
situation from press reports.
5. See STOTZKY, supra note 2, at 24, 56-57, 87.
6. See id. at 19.
7. See JEFFREY STOUT, ETHIcs AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND
THEIR DISCONTENTS 145-162 (1988).
8. See STOTZKY, supra note 2 at 116.
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Among Haitians, Stotzky reports, subtle and insidious
cultural distinctions reinforce the acceptability of classifying other humans as objectified "other" rather than as
fellow persons. Nuanced distinctions of appearance, including facial features as well as skin color, define complex
categories of status. So too do language (only a privileged 810% of the population speak French, the official court and
school language until Aristide's return) and religion (Catholic elites disdain Vodoun, even while secretly practicing it).
Apparently these status categories have dominated social
thought, seeming more "real" than the inclusive conception
of "person"-a conception which does not obliterate other
social distinctions, but at least renders them more
contingent than essential.9
In Haiti, status distinctions are reinforced through
networks of influence and corruption that drain the nation's
people and resources to the point of utterly defying our own
concept of rational self-interest. 10 The power gradations and
dependencies of patronage and cronyism within the Haitian
corporatist economic structure are more highly valued even
than the pursuit of wealth, which a more efficient
deployment of resources would surely facilitate."
Thus Haiti stands as a counter-model to our usual
Enlightenment assumptions, not only about equality of
rights, but also about the force of rational self-interest. The
challenge of the Aristide (now post-Aristide) period has
been to bring democracy to a culture deeply rooted in
"avarice, oppression, and injustice," and Stotzky's question
is Merton's: "How could this be possible?" As Stotzky
recognizes, that "how" cannot be answered simply by discrete institutional reforms like fair election procedures, an
9. See id. at 21-24. For reflections on the meaning of the "person," see

generally

MICHAEL CARRITHERS, STEVEN COLLINS AND STEVEN LUKEs,
CATEGORY OF THE PERSON: ANTHROPOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY (1985).

THE

10. See Robert H. Bates, Rui J. P. de Figueiredo Jr. and Barry R. Weingast,
The Politics of Interpretation:Rationality, Culture, and Transition, 26 POLITICS
AND SOCIETY 603 (1998) (noting the possibility of incorporating the values and
symbols of different cultures when employing a game theory analysis, as still
essentially premised on self-interest).
11. See STOTZKY, supra note 2 at 85. Stotzky also cites the disgust of some of
the younger and more enlightened in Haiti who have been educated abroad and
who report that the old, powerful elite would rather pay money in bribes than in
the taxes which are much-needed for infrastructure, social services, etc. A huge
black market and a powerful smuggling trade contribute to the role of
corruption. Id. at 187, 189.
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independent judiciary, and a reasonably fair and sensible
system of taxation. However crucial those reforms might be,
Stotzky insists that to be effective, they must reflect a deep
cultural transformation, and should give effect to the moral
justification for democracy itself. Because the normative
and the practical are deeply interconnected, the prodemocracy forces in Haiti must be able convincingly to
answer a basic and challenging normative question: Why is
fication?'
on. "good"? What is its ultimate ethical justiThus the tragic case of Haiti, in its strange and troubling particularity, raises the broadest possible theoretical
questions about the meaning of democracy in relation to the
dilemma of cultural relativism. By confronting Haiti, we
confront moral difference at its starkest, and we ask why,
exactly, that difference constitutes a "wrong" requiring
change. As Stotzky points out, Haitian elites no doubt have
their own language of justification and their own shared
cultural norms b73 which their practices can seem principled
and reasonable. ' Paradoxically, moreover, the questions
raised by Haiti, even in its difference-to-the-point-ofincommensurability, are our questions as well. Haiti's
history is intimately bound up with the history of United
States policy (as with support support for centralized power
and for the Papa Doc regime, along with CIA involvement
in Haitian politics) and its welfare depends in part on the
future direction of United States and international policy
choices. 4
The prologue to Stotzky's book, in fact, describes the
high drama of Aristide's triumphant return to Haiti-on
terms negotiated by the United States. Aristide is escorted
to the airport by Warren Christopher and flown to Haiti
aboard a U.S. Air Force plane, accompanied by U.S.
officials. This drama takes place, however, against a backdrop of discriminatory U.S. treatment of Haitian
immigrants,
whose mass exodus from Haiti precipitated a
U.S. political crisis and the Clinton administration's action.
The drama also takes place in conjunction with the U.S.
refusal to secure democracy by seizing hidden paramilitary
arms caches and keeping paramilitary leaders in detention.
12. See id. at 55-63.
13. See id. at 116. On the complexity of some of these questions, see Makau
Wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INTL. L. 589 (1996).
14. See STOTZKY, supra note 2 at 24-51, 205-07.
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Ironically, but apparently inescapably, the future of Haitian
"self-determination," as described by Stotzky, seems always
to be, in no small measure, a function of United States
decision-making.
True to his insistence that democracy requires both a
theoretical and a practical, contextual foundation, Stotzky
devotes Part One of his book, following the prologue, chiefly
to Haitian history and to a description of conditions in Haiti
upon Aristide's return; the analysis ranges from the origins
of Haitian dictatorship to topographical barriers to
economic development. Stotzky next shifts to a normative
and theoretical level, describing his conception of
deliberative, participatory democracy. Finally, he moves
back to the particular context of Haiti, and its recent
history under Aristide and Preval.
Perhaps the greatest strength of Stotzky's book lies in
this determination to connect theory and context, a
connection which requires a combination of approaches
drawn from philosophy, political theory, history, sociology
and economics. The result is pragmatic in the best ethical
sense-serious, direct engagement with basic moral questions, without the pretense that those questions can yield
timeless and universal answers. Stotzky's book is thus
important not only as a study of Haiti, but also as an
approach to the methodology of normatively-based political
theory.
Stotzky argues that a successful transition to
democracy in Haiti cannot come from trying simply to
emulate the institutional structures of the developed
nations, with their emphasis on separation of powers and
their relatively low levels of political engagement in civil
society. He suggests, instead, a model somewhere between a
protectionist, nationalistic populism and strict economic
neo-liberalism. That model would include a market
economy but would also allow the conditions of social and
economic life to be subject to the ongoing, vigorous
democratic debate from which the habits of democracy are
learned. His analysis has obvious relevance, not only to
Haiti, but to other emerging democracies as well.
In Haiti this model would necessarily require the
destruction of the old corporatist alliance which linked
military power to wealth, to Catholic Church hierarchy, to
political authority, and to dominant trade groups. The
dissolution of corporatist power, Stotzky argues, would
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allow the flourishing of vigorous local participatory groups
which, even before Aristide, had started to play an active
role in Haitian civil life. A full transition to democracy
would also require the formation of political parties able to
compete for power without chaos and violence; and it would
require a functioning, independent legal system as protection against both corporatist corruption and military
domination.
In light of these requirements, Stotzky then evaluates,
not without criticism, Aristide's initial proposals for reform
and Haiti's first steps toward democracy. He gives
especially hopeful emphasis to human rights trials, and also
to recent elections, but he describes as well how U.S. and
Haitian policy has become embroiled in destructive Washington political maneuvering and CIA operations. While his
conclusion is guardedly optimistic, he recognizes the
fragility of democratic reform in light of Haiti's deeply
engrained habits of violence and domination.
Inevitably, Stotzky's book poses, without pretending
fully to answer, hard questions about similarity and difference. While at one level Haiti's culture seems darkly and
radically different from ours, Western democracies can
hardly claim a history of innocence with respect to the
"sins" that are part of Haitian life, such as the brutal treatment of others as an exploitable resource. Furthermore, of
course, within Western nations where democracy is
accepted as a virtually self-evident good, the justification
and definition of that good is less than self-evident, and still
subject to debate.
Stotzky's own justification for democracy in Haiti is an
eclectic combination 5 of three normative goals and definitions: utilitarian, republican, and Kantian, in ascen-ding
order of priority. As for the first, Stotzky recognizes that
democracy will have little chance of flourishing in an
economy as wretched as Haiti's. Haiti has been, and remains, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere,
with a per-capita income of $370 per year and malnutrition
among 70% of the children, combined with environmental
degradation and infrastructure dilapid-ation."6 Stotzky
15. See STOTZKY, supra note 2 at 62 (describing his method as a whole,
combining a variety of academic disciplines, as "eclectic"). This insistence on
combining rather than isolating disciplines, along with the insistence on
relating theory and practice, is one of the great strengths of the book.
16. See STOTZKY, supra note 2 at 86.
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sensibly recognizes that Haiti needs a functioning market
economy in order to provide even a minimal level of welfare
for Haiti's people. That means freeing the economy from
corporatist political controls and opening it up for at least
some competitive private investment.' In turn, private
investment requires a legal system that provides some
reasonable measure of transparency and predictability.
Indeed, one of Stotzky's arguments for the rule of law rests
directly on the need for efficiency. As he effectively shows,
Haiti is a stunning example of how, with bribery and corruption as the assumed norm, economic actors are caught
up in various forms of "dumb anomie": Each actor keeps
participating in the system of corruption even though the
end result is disastrously inefficient for everyone. Haiti is so
completely caught up in this vicious cycle of corruption that
Stotzky pessimistically predicts the cycle may be ultimately
unbreakable. 8
At one level, therefore, efficiency and democracy are
closely linked. The same Haitian patterns of corruption
which create disastrous inefficiencies also keep in place the
corportist alliance between wealth and state power which
has simultaneously terrorized the population and blocked
economic development. During periods of economic
transition, however, the tidy link between efficiency and
democracy does not always hold, and when it breaks down,
difficult political and normative dilemmas emerge. For
example, apparently the only way to break through Haiti's
economic impasse and to encourage development is to seek
foreign investment in combination with investment by
domestic elites who still control the onljy available wealth in
the otherwise capital-scarce country. Negotiations with
the World Bank and the IMF have led to proposals for
restructuring which require privatization and encourage
joint ventures between domestic and foreign investors.
For a time the Aristide and Preval governments generally favored at least partial privatization as the only way
to encourage development and break up the old corporatist
alliances-as well as the only way to qualify for aid from
the international community. Nevertheless, within the near
future a genuinely competitive private market economy
17. See id. at 84.
18. See id. at 96-97.
19. See id. at 187.
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within Haiti is probably impossible. Under privatization,
the wealthy will regain their oligopolistic power and
continue to dominate the economy; with domination of the
economy will come, inevitably, a return to political
influence. The only realistic source of serious market competition is from abroad, through lowered trade and investment restrictions; lower trade barriers would have the
added benefit of reducing the incentive to deal in the
corrupt contraband market. Invigorated trade, however,
would also have the immediate effect of destroying those in
Haiti who have been most supportive of democratic reform-small urban entrepreneurs, artisans and agricultural
peasants. Meanwhile, those who would most benefit would
be the elites who have long dominated the import/export
business, and whose influence has been consistently
antidemocratic 0
Thus, while it is possible to point to a theoretical interdependence between free markets and democracy, at the
concrete, practical, contextual level that congruence is
neither easy nor automatic. Of course, if the goal is improvement rather than (impossible) free market perfection,
it might, for the sake of economic development, seem easy
to settle even for extensive monopoly power on the market
so long as that power does not mean direct access to
terrorist police squads. Yet now, many pro-democratic political forces in Haiti so fear the continued domination of the
elites that they are unwilling to relinquish state control
over the economy. From their perspective, there must be
only bitter irony in the international pressure toward privatization and joint-venture investment: Having finally
wrested power from the upper class which once dominated
the political/economic order, they are, in effect, immediately
being asked to relinquish economic power right back to the
same upper classes and/or to powerful foreign investors1
and the domestic elite are eager to regain their control.
Nevertheless, despite continued democratic resistance to
market reforms, the future of democracy in Haiti will
ultimately depend upon the economic development that
only private markets can bring. People are already apparently becoming so disillusioned and debilitated by

20. See id. at 109-13.
21. See id. at 188.
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unrelenting poverty as to lose faith in democracy itself.22
Paradoxically, in other words, democracy requires the very
reforms which democratic forces in Haiti with good reason
oppose, and there seems no easy way to break the impasse.
When confronting this paradox, and the difficult choices
that result, Stotzky insists upon the priority of democratic
decision-making over long-term efficiency. Markets are not
their own excuse for being, and the economy is properly
subject to democratic control. 3 What, then, is the special
"good" of democracy itself?
Stotzky separates justificatory theories of democracy
into two basic camps. The first, interest group pluralism,
which he rejects, derives the moral value of democracy
precisely from the relativity of values otherwise. Since no
norms transcend individual preference, the virtue of
democracy lies in the free play of subjective preference on
the political as well as the economic market place. Like
market economics itself, the underlying philosophy is
utilitarian. 4
In contrast, Stotzky's own "epistemic" theory of
democracy rejects the assumption that no norms transcend
subjective preference. Stotzky argues that the process of
democratic participation itself-conceived as reasoned
dialogue-can yield access to moral values which have
objective priority over aggregated self-interest. While those
values may be neither self-evident nor logically demonstrable, they can be "known," at least tentatively, through
the process of reasoned dialogue itself, as people,
interacting with each other, learn to take account of the
needs and views of each other. Protecting the integrity of
this process is, for Stotzky, more important than, for
example, insuring Assembly adoption of IMF-mandated
privatization plans."
Stotzky assigns the highest moral value, not to
representative democracy in the Assembly or to the popular
election of the President-however important those may
be-but rather to the experience of direct participatory
democracy at the local level, an experience that has now
become part of Haitian life. Stotzky's participatory theory of
democracy has been influenced by the work of Carlos S.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See Rohter, supranote 4, at A2.
See STOTZKY, supra note 2 at 82.
See id. at 64-65.
See id. at 66-75.
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Nino, a former adviser to the President of Argentina and
author of The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy;
Stotzky and Nino have collaborated on studies relating to
democracy during transitional periods. It also reflects the
influence of the whole republicanism debate which came to
a few years ago in American legal scholarthe forefront
27
ship.

Participatory theories of democracy are not, of course,
without their own troubling features, which were explored
at some length during the republican revival in legal
thought. Republicanism's greatest scholar and interpreter,
J.G.A. Pocock, showed that historically republicanism has
tended toward either religious apocalypse or, in its more
secular forms, toward self-determination and self-renewal
through militarism.28 James Harrington, the English
republican theorist whose work most directly and powerfully influenced the United States during the early days of
the republic, avoided those two extremes only by explicitly
basing his model of democracy on the example of ancient
Israel, and by proposing constant renewal through rotating
representation and periodic redistribution of land.29
In this country the pure republican model was, of
course, rejected by the Federalists as incompatible with a
flourishing commercial life."0 Pure, localized popular
26. Id. at 62 and 247-48 at n.2.
27. See id. at 63. See also Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539 (1988); Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American
Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987). For a recent and
thoughtful reconsideration in relation to property, see G. ALEXANDER,
COMMODITY AND PROPERTY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL

THOUGHT 1776-1790 (1997).
28. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 73
(1977). See also J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHEIAVELLIAN MOMENT 372-73 (1975).
29. See Elizabeth B. Mensch, Images of Self and Images of Polity in the
Aftermath of the Reformation, in Madness, Melancholy, and the Limits of the
Self, 3 GRAVEN IMAGES 249, 255 (1996).
30. Some at the time assumed the compatibility of commercial markets and
republicanism, but Harrington himself understood republicanism to rest on a
foundation of land alone. See POCOCK, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES
HARRINGTON, supra note 28, at ; see also GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY
AND PROPERTY (1997) (describing in Parts I and H the competing conceptions of
property); Elizabeth Mensch, Religion Revival and the Ruling Class:A Critical
History of Trinity Church, 36 BuFF. L. REV. 427, 474-76 (1987); Elizabeth
Mensch & Alan Freeman, A RepublicanAgenda for HobbesianAmerica? 41 FLA.
L. REV. 581, 600-06 (1989). See generally JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW
SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790s (1984).
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sovereignty during the revolutionary period had often
proved more chaotic than virtuous,3 1 and its practice in the
colonies had left memories that were not altogether
positive: Long town meetings could become so burdensome
that "free" participation sometimes had to be coerced.32 At
its very worst, participatory democracy can descend into
something resembling Milton's famous parody of democracy
as practiced among the fallen angels-manipulative
eloquence in the service of ignoble ends, with the final vote
serving only to ratify the preconceived goals of the
powerful.33
Stotzky's book is oddly short on social history, so we
learn little about why democracy initially began to take
hold among the Haitians at a local participatory level. Most
Haitians are unlikely to have been directly influenced by
James Harrington or by the U.S. legal academy-or even by
Nino, although there the influence is more plausible. A
more likely influence is the base community movement of
Catholic liberation theology, which has been powerful and
widespread in Latin America. Stotzky mentions briefly that
some within the Catholic Church have helped to encourage
participatory grass roots movements, despite the alliance
between the Catholic hierarchy and the Haitian elite
otherwise."' For the most part, however, Stotzky leaves
religion out of his account altogether, despite his emphasis
on cultural transformation-an emphasis that constitutes
one of central contributions of the book. If, as Stotzky
suggests, democracy is in large measure a cultural formand a reflection, therefore, of internalized cultural values
and habitual modes of thought and practice-then the
complex Haitian combination of Vodoun and Catholicism
deserves more analysis. The success of democracy in Haiti
will surely depend in part on its resonance with the people's
religious life and modes of thinking, yet Stotzky does not
consider democracy as a theological question. "
31. See Mensch & Freeman, supra note 30, at 588-90. The classic study of
the period is

GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

1776-

1787 (1969).
32. See Elizabeth Z. Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property
Rights, 31 BUFF. L. REv. 635, 649 (1982).
33. See JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Book II, Lines 43-505 (Scott Elledge

ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1975).
34. See Stotzky, supranote 2, at 89.
35. For one account of liberation theology, see R. M. BROWN, LIBERATION
THEOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE (1993). For emphasis on "habits" of
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From a theological perspective, of course, participation,
however much it is valued, is not its own excuse for being,
any more than is efficiency, and Stotzky notably takes the
same position. For Stotzky democracy is a means, not an
end, and so far as can be discerned (the argument proceeds
somewhat by indirection) the end to be achieved is
essentially Kantian. Stotzky argues that people, when
thinking and acting as individuals, will do very well in
evaluating and representing their own interests but will not
necessarily consider, or even notice, the impact of action on
others; thus, in their decision-making, they will not
properly take into account the welfare of others, who should
be always regarded as equals in autonomy and personhood.
In other words, people will not always recognize what
duties are commanded by the categorical imperative.
Participation in democracy is the social process by which
people can do normative deliberation in a manner which
forces them, in their collectivity, to take full and equal
account of others.36
While Stotzky's goal is the Kantian one of reasoned
ethical norms, his confidence in reason itself is muted. In a
time of epistemological uncertainty, he seems to suggest,
the outcome of the deliberative process may be provisional
and contextual rather than self-evidently objective and
universal. Continuing participation becomes the process by
which a people move toward norms which remain everelusive." It is therefore the inadequacy of individual
reasoning of the provisionality of ethical norms (two
assumptions not usually associated with Kant) which leads
Stotzky to turn Kant's description of individual ethical
reasoning into a political theory in justification of
democracy.38
However provisional the duty-defining results of the
social decision-making process might be, Stotzky insists on
one seemingly foundational, preconditional Kantian basethinking in political change, see G. Wood, supra note 31, at 1. That means, of
course, that the habits of one culture are not easily transferred to another; and
habits of democracy cannot be imposed without self-contradiction.
36. See STOTZKY, supranote 2 at 68-70.
37. See id. at 69.
38. For the argument that Kant never meant the Second Critique to be the
basis for political theory, see HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL
PimLosoPHY 7-10 (Ronald Beines, ed. 1982). Of course, liberal theory has tended
nevertheless to appropriate the Kantian model of autonomy as a basis for
legal/political argument.
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line-the treatment of individuals as ends rather than'
means, as autonomous persons whose rights are protected
under law. 9
This protection runs completely counter to the routine
Haitian practices of "predation," and for that reason Stotzky
finds the effort to vindicate human rights abuses through
legal trials to be the single most important sign of hope for
democracy in Haiti. The past practice in Haiti has been to
warehouse prisoners in unthinkably deplorable conditions
with no notice of the crime supposedly committed and
certainly no procedural safeguards4 -a practice only barely
preferable to simple slaughter, which is also routine. In
sharp contrast, Stotzky envisions a criminal justice system
in which punishment is an expression of solidarity with
those whose rights have been violated and, even with
respect to those guilty of past ruthless human rights
abuses, also an expression of community respect for the
autonomy of the one who is punished. The prisoner should
understand

the nature

of the

duty he or

she has

transgressed, and accept the justice of the punishment.4'
The contrast between this conception of criminal justice
and Haitian norms is so startling that one might ask,
quizzically, why invoke it? Even within the U.S. legal
system, respect for the rights of both victims and prisoners
as autonomous individuals seems squeezed between the
drive for social control (leading, e.g., to a fourfold increase
in incarceration rates since the early 1970s) and a wistful
longing for the therapeutic possibility of rehabilitationboth, in different ways, essentially utilitarian goals. 4' Even

in relation to Haiti specifically, the U.S. has been less than
eager to cooperate with the vindication of human rights
abuses.4" More generally, the confident Kantian image of

39. See id. at 70.
40. See id. at 90-91.
41. See id. at 98, 114-16.
42. See JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMNAL LAW: CASE AND MATERIALS 30 (1996);
see also Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be Punished: Autonomy and Its
Demise in Modern Penal Thought, 16 LAw & HIST. REV. 113 (1998). Dubber's
work as a whole represents a challenging and significant reminder of the
respect for autonomy and the empathetic identification with offender, as fellow
rational person, which lay at the core of the Enlightenment theory of criminal
punishment. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of
Crime and Punishment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1577 (1994).

43. See Philip Shenon, Nowadays, Crimes Against Humanity Often Go
Unpunished,N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 1998, at A3.
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the autonomous individual exercising his/her reason to
arrive at objective norms seems, itself, a passing
intellectual construct and Stotzky's emphasis, therefore, an
odd hold-over from Enlightenment theory. If, as Stotzky in
effect concedes, confidence in the authority and selfsufficiency of reason has eroded, what is then left of the
Kantian conception of autonomy? A conception of human
rights derives ultimately from a conception of what it
means to be human, which in Kantian terms
is inextricably
44
linked to the capacity to exercise reason.
A central question which emerges from Stotzky's book,
therefore, is whether the Enlightenment conception of
autonomy can still sustain the weight Stotzky assumes that
it can, as a foundational presupposition for a conception of
democracy itself. The argument even for relevance may
seem strained, both as to the tortured context of Haiti
(which
never
really
experienced
the
Western
Enlightenment) and to the current intellectual climate
generally. Stotzky never quite addresses that question
directly, even though perhaps the most impressive aspect of
Stotzky's book otherwise lies in its insistence on the
necessary relation between the generality of normative
theory and the particularity of social/historical context. It is
at least worth noting, however, that other scholars have
attempted to reread Kant through the lens, as it were, of
both our own anti-foundationalist intellectual context and
the religious context within which Kant himself wrote."
The result is a more contingent, historically constructed
conception of autonomy which may more closely resonate
with current thought and, more important with relation to
Stotzky's work, with the Christianized version of direct
democracy which has now become part of the Haitian
experience.
Kant is often taken as almost defining what the
Enlightenment came to represent: the dignity of a selfsufficient, autonomous human reason freed from the
44. There may be some ambiguity here. Stotzky calls for a social process of
reasoned argument and deliberation, but he does not think individual reason
alone capable of adequately discerning norms applicable interpersonally. See
Stotzky, supra note 2, at 67-68.
45. See generally J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A
HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1998); WALTER LOWE, THEOLOGY AND
DIFFERENCE: THE WOUND OF REASON (1993) (analyzing Kantian theory upon
which much of the following argument is based).
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external authority46 of positivist (Protestant) divine
command and from the authority of those laws ontologically
rooted in the order of nature itself (more typical of
Catholicism). Moreover, Kantian reason was also freed from
the tyranny of desire-the hierarchical ordering of desire
then typical of Christian traditionalism as well as the selfinterested calculation of desire typical of utilitarianism. 4'
The latter version (unlike, arguably, the Christian one)
allowed for no escape from egoism. Stotzky's rejection of
market efficiency as the highest form of good is therefore
utterly consistent with his appeal to Kantian ethics as
directed toward transcending pure self-interest.
As against all of those oppressions, ranging from God's
command to self-interest, Kant posited the freedom of the
individual, defining freedom as the freely-willed choice to
act in accord with the dictates of human reason itself: dictates of internal consistency, principled universality, and
utter impartiality.' Hence the "test" for any maxim of
moral duty as framed by the categorical imperative:
whether we can consistently will that "everyone should
always act upon it." 49 To act otherwise than in accord with
duty so conceived is to be untrue to reason, and therefore to
be inconsistent.
In effect, Stotzky locates this freedom within the
dialogic process of democratic participation rather than
solely within the individual. Participation provides a check
to unprincipled partiality and the tendency to promote one's
own needs and desires, providing at least tentative access,
therefore, to a "reasoned" definition of duty. Stotzky also
assumes, however, that individual autonomy is a precondition for democracy. The result is conceptually a bit
puzzling. Presumably, collective action which violates individual freedom (i.e., which is irrational) would be tyranny,
which is why democracy is not "good" by definition. The
source of norms, however, by which Stotzky would judge the
outcomes of democratic decision-making remains somewhat
46. See ALASDAiR MACINTYRE, AFTER ViRTUE 45 (1984); CHARLES TAYLOR,
SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY

364 (1989).

47. See LOWE, supra note 44, at 104. Thus "obedience to moral law is an
exercise of freedom," and autonomy becomes, conversely, a "matter of
obedience." J. MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND SECULAR
REASON (1990) at 62.
48. See TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 366.
49. MACINTYRE, supra note 45, at 45.
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undefined, although clearly once source he draws upon is
the Western historical tradition of human rights
protection. 5--0 suggesting a conception of autonomy that is
more historically contingent than foundational and perhaps
therefore more in accord with an historical understanding
of autonomy itself, although also more difficult to apply to a
nation which does not share the same history.
During Kant's time, the call to human freedom had
been suspect because it seemed to undermine the authority
of religion. More currently it seems suspect because reason
itself is understood as a vocabulary of authority, as
justification for coercion. To claim reason on one's side is to
legitimate the exercise of power. In relation to the situation
in Haiti, however, it may be worth recalling that in Kant's
own historical context the emphasis on autonomous reason
was in fact an emphasis on equality, not authority. In a
context which accepted as natural and "given" an elaborate
social system of fixed, essentialist hierarchical categories (a
perverse version of which now exists in Haiti) Kant
represented a determination to smash through hierarchy
and to assert the fundamental human equality implicit in a
shared capacity for moral understanding." No easily
available alternative secular argument on behalf of equality
provides the power of that great Enlightenment claim.
Moreover, that claim was not, in context, necessarily
the proud secular boast it is often taken to have been.
Kant's perspective was in part scientific and in part
theological. This combination led him to appreciate both the
vastness of the universe and its relativizing effect on all
human and natural hierarchy. Kant's own early scientific
work had described a universe which was far more limitless
than even the one Newton had conceived. Nevertheless,
Kant pointed out that from the perspective of God (for Kant,
a somewhat abstract construct), even the whole vastness of
the universe, with its spatial and temporal infinity, where
"millions and whole myriads of millions of centuries will
flow on, during which always new worlds and new systems
of world will be formed," was no greater and no less
perishable than the smallest particle. The whole universe
was reducible to a "mere point."53 In other words, from the
50.
51.
52.
53.

See STOTZKY, supranote 2 at 57.
See SCHNEEWIND, supranote 44, at 490, 515.
LOWE, supranote 44 at 92.
Id. at 93.
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perspective of a transcendent God, outside human time and
space, "the great and small are small alike,"54 so that all
human claims based on differences and apparent
superiorities are reduced to triviality-very much in the
spirit of the Catholic liberation
anti-hierarchical
theologians.
When Kant in the Second Critique famously compares
the reasoned, human moral law "within" to the vast starry
heavens above, that seemingly boastful passage must be
read in light of the assumption of radical relativity.55 The
human always remained human, which meant utterly
perishable, and, in fact, marked by brokenness and
disjuncture, not perfection. Epistemologically, as Kant
argued in the Critique of Pure Reason, the mind's very
creativity, which seemed to make it god-like, introduced an
element of uncertainty and indeterminacy into our
knowledge of external reality and into our knowledge even
of ourselves. We may not be, Kant says, in a position to
distinguish what we directly experience from what our
mind adds to that experience. The world is not fully present
to the experiencing subject, nor is the subject fully present
even to itself.56
54. Id. at 89.
55. See id. at 76. At the same time, however, Kant does insist that the
human reason upon which he bases his argument for human dignity and
autonomy is a non-contingent capacity that lifts human beings out of their
otherwise limited and animal existence. See id. at 78. This claim can best be
understood in relation to a theological debate that, at the time of Kant, was
inseparable from moral theory. During that period, disputes still raged between
volunteerists and antivolunteerists, disputes that had become tiresome and
seemed without resolution. An "objective" moral law, rooted in God's reason and
reflected in nature, bound even God himself, in seeming contradiction to God's
freedom and transcendence; yet a positivist moral law whose only basis lay in
God's unfettered will, with no relation to an objectively conceived justice,
appeared arbitrary and capricious, demanding servile obedience rather than
true accord. Kant brilliantly thought his way through that problem in moral
theory by positing a conception of duty that, was objective but also rooted solely
in human reason. Liberated from the externally based objective necessity of
natural law, the Kantian conception of duty was capable of summoning our
accord without violating either God's freedom or ours. See SCHNEEWND, supra
note 44 at 508-13.
56. See LOWE, supra note 44, at 94-8. By way of contrast, Kant posited the
(again, abstractly conceived) counter example of God as one who experiences no
difference between pure intuition (receptivity) and (creative) thought. For God
alone is there no disjunction between the inviting subject and the object in its
full presence, because for God, knowing and creating are one. For humans, by
contrast, the creativity of the mind is a problem. We long for unmediated
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This problem of disjuncture within human reasons does
not disappear when we move to the realm of ethical reason,
despite Kant's emphasis on objectivity. Kant is well known
for the distinction between pragmatic reason and
categorical reason. The first is a calculation of means and
ends, not qualitatively different from a calculation of cause
and effect. The only relevant question is how to reach the
desired object, and the human subject, even while
"reasoning," remains enslaved by desire, as well as plagued
by epistemological uncertainty.
It is in contrast to means/ends reasoning that Kant
posited the purely formal character of ethical reasoning as
such, characterized by the consistency and universality
demanded by reason's own requirements. This formality
may well require that we act contrary to our own desires; it
may also require that we do violence even to the welfare of
others, as with Kant's famous example of the formal
obligation not to lie, even when to tell the truth means to
surrender friends to enemy soldiers.57 The oft-cited coldness
and rigor of this demand for formal consistency may appear
so at odds with our current understanding and experience
as to seem actually unethical. Moreover, current critical
thought has become so adept at reducing supposedly
neutral, universal, reasoned principles to inconsistency and
self-contradiction that full confidence in any supposedly
universal norm would be difficult to recover. Hence
Stotzky's concession that ethical norms are necessarily
provisional in nature, which is a reason for locating them in
the outcome of participatory democracy.
At another level, however, Kant's emphasis on the
distinctive character of categorical reasoning can itself be
taken as a statement about the self-divided nature of
human reason itself. The categorical conception of duty
points to a formal reality which, while seemingly outside of
ourselves, actually resides solely within and asks for our
assent only to internal norms which can offer no external
validation. Moreover, Kant never denied the true
experience yet are cut off from knowledge even of ourselves. See id. at 98-101,
drawing on the analysis of John Sallis.
57. For criticism on this Kantian position on grounds that it fails to take
account of the real ambiguity of human experience, see "What is Meant by
'Telling the Truth" in DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 326-34 (1955).
58. For one recent account, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION (1997).
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"rationality" or value of prudential reason, upon which
human survival depends. While seeming to suppose the
existence of neatly separated faculties within the mind for
each type of reason, Kant did not postulate some internal
guide confidently assigning appropriate tasks for each. 9
Instead, humans exist in a state of ambiguity, facing a
material world of confusing particularity in a state of
epistemological uncertainty, and drawn toward conflicting
demands lodged even within themselves.
Not surprisingly, therefore, a starkly Augustinian tone
emerges from Kant's description of the brokenness of
human will.60 Only a being (i.e., God) who does not have to
struggle to mediate between conflicting aspects of the self is
completely free from that brokenness. For the rest of us,
that "internal difference is irreducible"6 ' and the fact that
we can name the possibility of its transcendence does not
change its irreducibility.62
It is at least worth noting in passing that American law,
too, seems to find itself in its own state of indeterminacy in
the face of seemingly irreducible difference as it answers to
the conflicting claims of categorical and consequentialist
reasoning without being able to transcend their difference.63
Haiti, meanwhile, is in a more desperate state of turmoil, a
turmoil which might be described almost as a tortured
enactment of the same dilemma. Preval is caught between
former, disaffected Aristide supporters in the Assembly
(which he suspended) and Aristide loyalists who want to
regain control in the name of greater moral/democratic
purity. Conditions worsen: Haiti not only remains the
poorest nation in the hemisphere, with the highest illiteracy
and worst infant mortality rate; it has, since Aristide's
return, also moved rapidly from 124' to 159' in the
While
international scale of economic development.'
59. This problem was only taken up later in life by Kant, in CRITIQUE OF
JUDGEMENT, where he proposes aesthetic judgement as such a guide. See
ARENDT, supran. 38 at 10-16, 51-85.

60. See TAYLOR, supranote 45 at 366.
61. Id. at 366.
62. Therefore, for the sake of explaining the human situation, Kant
postulates, by way of contrast, a Holy Will within which to will is the same as to
accomplish, so that the material is, so to speak, absorbed within the formal. See
LOWE, supranote 44 at 117, 125-26.
63. One might read Richard Epstein's casebook on Torts (R. Epstein, Cases
and Materials on Torts, 1995) as an extended meditation on that theme.
'See Router, supra note 4, at 3.
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Aristide no longer holds office, he uses his influence, some
charge, to engage on a mission of messianic
obstructionism.65 Stotzky describes Aristide as a leader
determined to remain in solidarity with those whose
personhood rights have been violated by a history of cruel
abuse. From that perspective, it is tempting to cheer on his
refusal to compromise a (categorical) conception of duty for
the (consequentialist) sake of economic well-being or
political stability. Meanwhile, however, even the human
rights trials, a core symbol of the (Kantian) vindication of
human rights in Haiti, are grinding to a halt for want of
financing as Haiti finds itself caught in moral paradox:
Needed market reforms threaten to undercut the moral
foundation of the new democracy, yet that same moral
foundation depends on the economic well-being that only
successful market reforms can bring.66
In this real world of paradox and ambiguity, a world
shaped by the always messy and often grim particularities
of history, not the tidy abstractions of pure theory, perhaps
the very "best" ethical choices are in fact the very worst:
Pure adherence to duty (if that in fact is what Aristide
represents) may impose a cost so grave as to be itself
unethical, in the precise sense of using the utterly
predictable suffering of others as a means toward an
external end. In such a situation it may be useful to invoke
the more theological take on Kantian ethics, as described
above, and recall how indeterminate our human situation
really is. How so ever much the Kantian tradition has
emphasized the distinction between consequentialist and
ethical reasoning, Kant himself never suggested that
ethical reasoning was other than human reasoning. On the
flip side of the arrogance with which he separated
autonomous human categorical reasoning from God's
command, one sees revealed as well a hearty dose of
humility. Unaided human reason is both unaided and
human, which means it is exercised by material creatures,
alone in a universe of "myriads and whole myriads of
millions" of worlds and dependent for their very survival on
also being able, albeit imperfectly, to weigh costs and
predict consequences.
Moreover, nothing makes the inherent ambiguity and
65. Id.
66. Id.
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internal division of the human condition more evident than
the very fact of those dualistic categories Kant constructed
for us, by which we find ourselves experiencing, as it were,
our own experience. In that sense we might see in the
divisions that now plague Haiti, not only exotic incommensurability but also, simultaneously, our own mirror
image. Kant himself held open the hope that the separation
between duty and desire might eventually be closed,
thereby posing the possibility of a unity which the pietists
would,
earliest training
for Kant's
responsible
unhesitatingly, have labeled grace. Merton, too, suggested
the same possibility in relation to history, thereby holding
out the hope that even centuries of evil could be replaced, if
only fleetingly, by love, charity, and sanctity. For the
patient people of Haiti that hope must seem an empty one.

